Windows Hardening Guide: Baselines, ASR and Identity

(The image is AI-generated) 
 

 

 

Last updated: November 16, 2026

A default Windows installation is built to work in as many environments as possible. It is not built to resist an attacker who already has a foothold on your network. Closing that gap takes deliberate hardening, and in most enterprises that work lands in four places: Group Policy and security baselines, Microsoft Defender, Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules, and the way accounts and service accounts are managed.

This guide walks through each of the four, using Microsoft's own documentation wherever it exists. It also corrects several details that circulate in older hardening write-ups, including how Credential Guard is enabled today, what EDR in block mode is actually for, and why the newest service account type had a serious flaw in its first months. The Claim check table shows what held up. For the broader design thinking behind this, see How Operating Systems Enforce Security: A Layered Model.

Key takeaways
  • Use Microsoft's published baselines as a starting point, and verify they are actually reaching your devices.
  • Only three ASR rules are labeled "standard protection" and safe to enable without testing. Test the rest in Audit mode first.
  • Credential Guard is now on by default on qualifying Windows 11 and Windows Server 2025 systems, so the real task is checking for compatibility problems, not just switching it on.
  • EDR in block mode is aimed at devices where a non-Microsoft antivirus is primary, and it needs Defender for Endpoint Plan 2.
  • The new delegated Managed Service Account (dMSA) type had a privilege escalation flaw, BadSuccessor, fixed in August 2025. Patch domain controllers and review OU permissions.

Group Policy and security baselines

The foundation of Windows hardening is a tested, versioned baseline applied the same way across your estate. Microsoft's Security Compliance Toolkit (SCT) is a set of tools for downloading, analyzing, testing, editing and storing Microsoft-recommended configuration baselines. Administrators can compare their current Group Policy Objects (GPOs) with the recommended ones, store them in GPO backup format, and apply them through Active Directory or locally. The toolkit lists baselines for Windows 10 and 11, Windows Server versions including 2025, Microsoft 365 Apps and Microsoft Edge, and it includes the Policy Analyzer and Local Group Policy Object (LGPO) tools.

Windows Server 2025 adds a second route. OSConfig is a PowerShell-based tool that applies and maintains security baselines on Windows Server 2025 and detects configuration drift. It works through PowerShell, Windows Admin Center and Azure Policy, and it does not support earlier server versions. Its baselines are role-aware, with separate versions for domain controllers, member servers and workgroup servers. One practical warning from Microsoft's documentation: after applying the member server or workgroup baseline, you are asked to change the local administrator password.

Microsoft has also said it plans to revise the Windows Server baseline more often. A June 2025 revision (v2506) for Windows Server 2025, for example, removed the legacy WDigest authentication setting. That is a reason to treat the baseline as something you track, not something you import once.

The architectural rule that matters most is to pick one enforcement path per device group. Group Policy suits domain-joined servers, while Intune or another device management tool suits cloud-managed clients. Two systems writing the same setting is how configuration drift starts.

In my analysis, the most common failure is the gap between a GPO existing and a GPO applying. A policy that is linked but filtered out by security group or WMI filtering can look correct in the editor while doing nothing on the target machines. The Policy Analyzer tool, plus regular compliance scans, is how you catch this. Keep your patch cadence tied to the same discipline, as described in our guide to building a patching policy for Windows, Linux and macOS.

Microsoft Defender: settings that matter

Three Defender settings deserve explicit attention. First, cloud protection is on by default and Microsoft recommends keeping it on, since several features depend on it, including block at first sight and EDR in block mode. Second, tamper protection causes changes to protected settings to be ignored, which stops malware or a local administrator from quietly switching protections off. If it blocks a change you genuinely need, Microsoft points to troubleshooting mode as a temporary measure.

Third, be precise about EDR in block mode. A common description says it blocks fileless attacks where no signatures exist. Microsoft's documentation frames it differently: it is designed to add protection on devices where a non-Microsoft antivirus is the primary product and Defender Antivirus runs in passive mode. It requires Defender for Endpoint Plan 2, cloud-delivered protection, and an up-to-date antivirus platform. Practitioners also note that in passive mode, other features such as ASR rules are not active. If your devices run Defender Antivirus as the primary engine, EDR in block mode is not the main lever, and ASR and cloud protection matter more.

Exclusions remain a quiet risk. Every excluded path is a place where scanning does not happen, so keep exclusions short, documented and reviewed. This is my recommendation from the way exclusions work, not a figure from a source.

Attack Surface Reduction: block behaviors, not files

ASR rules target risky software behavior that attackers commonly use, for example scripts that download files, obfuscated scripts and code injection into other processes. They constrain behavior instead of identifying files by content, which is why they help against techniques that signatures miss.

The key operational point comes straight from Microsoft's deployment guidance. Typically you can enable the standard protection rules in Block or Warn mode without testing, and Microsoft recommends enabling at minimum the three standard protection rules. All other rules should be tested in Audit mode first. The documented sequence is plan, test in Audit mode, then enable in Block or Warn mode, and expand in rings.

On platform coverage, Microsoft's reference lists a minimum of Windows Server version 1809 or later for most rules, while Windows Server 2016 and 2012 R2 are handled through the modern unified Defender solution. A web shell rule exists for servers, but it applies to the Exchange role only.

Configuration Manager is where many teams get caught. The rule that blocks process creations from PSExec and WMI commands is documented as unsupported for management through Configuration Manager, because the Configuration Manager client relies heavily on WMI. Some ASR rules also do not honor Defender Antivirus exclusions, so they need per-rule exclusions. Neither point means you should skip these rules. It means audit data tells you which of your own tools depend on the behavior.

Audit mode is not a permanent state either. A practitioner write-up from May 2026 lists rules sitting in Audit mode indefinitely as a common failure, because attacks pass through while the team believes it is protected. Set a review date when you enable Audit mode, and move to Block with exclusions that you can justify. I did not find an official figure for how long the audit phase should last, so choose a period based on your own application mix.

Identity hygiene: who holds privilege

The controls that decide whether one stolen credential becomes a domain-wide incident are mostly identity controls. Standard users should not be local administrators, and administrative work should happen from separate accounts. If you want the same reasoning applied to Unix-like systems, Linux Server Security: Hardening, Monitoring and Recovery covers the equivalent steps. The next three subsections cover the Windows-specific tools.

Windows LAPS

Windows Local Administrator Password Solution (Windows LAPS) rotates the local administrator password on each device, so a password stolen from one machine does not open the others. For domain-joined devices, Microsoft recommends Group Policy, found under Computer Configuration, Administrative Templates, System, LAPS. It processes policy about every hour.

One detail is easy to miss. Password encryption in Active Directory requires the domain to be at the Windows Server 2016 domain functional level or later. Below that level, you cannot enable encryption, and Microsoft strongly recommends enabling it when it is available. By default only Domain Admins can decrypt the stored password, and you can assign a dedicated group instead.

Credential Guard

Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to protect credential secrets. Older guides tell administrators to switch it on through Group Policy. That is now incomplete. According to Microsoft, starting with Windows 11 22H2 and Windows Server 2025, Credential Guard is enabled by default on domain-joined, non-domain-controller systems that meet the hardware and licensing requirements. The default is applied without UEFI lock, so administrators can still disable it remotely. If it was explicitly disabled before an upgrade, the upgrade does not turn it back on.

Microsoft also says enabling it on domain controllers is not recommended, because it adds no security there and can cause compatibility problems. Enabling it on Exchange Server is not supported. It does not protect the Active Directory database or the local SAM. Treat it as one layer, not a complete answer to credential theft.

Because it is now on by default, compatibility is the real work. Microsoft documents known issues, including a Hyper-V live migration problem for environments using CredSSP delegation after upgrading to Windows Server 2025. A vendor write-up also reports Wi-Fi and VPN failures for organizations using password-based PEAP authentication after Windows 11 22H2. Test authentication paths before broad rollout, and enable it before devices join the domain, since Microsoft warns that enabling it later may be too late for secrets already exposed.

Service accounts and BadSuccessor

Managed service accounts remove the habit of static, shared service passwords. Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSAs) suit multi-server services. Windows Server 2025 added delegated Managed Service Accounts (dMSAs), which press reports describe as introduced to mitigate Kerberoasting and which let administrators migrate an existing legacy service account.

That migration feature is where the problem was. In May 2025, Akamai researcher Yuval Gordon disclosed BadSuccessor, a privilege escalation path abusing dMSAs. It required an account with specific permissions in Active Directory and at least one Windows Server 2025 domain controller, and it worked with default settings. At disclosure there was no patch. Microsoft fixed it as CVE-2025-53779 in the August 2025 Patch Tuesday release, on August 12, 2025. Akamai's follow-up recommends patching Windows Server 2025 domain controllers first and then reviewing permissions on OUs, containers and dMSA objects.

Researchers have continued to examine the patch, so treat dMSA adoption like any new identity feature: patch first, then restrict who can create or modify these objects. Alongside that, keep a service account inventory with an owner and purpose for each, apply least privilege, and avoid broadly privileged accounts for services. Those are standard practices, and I am stating them as my recommendation, not as a quoted requirement.

Claim check

ClaimStatusNote
SCT provides baselines for Windows, Server, Microsoft 365 Apps and EdgeConfirmedMicrosoft Learn. Windows 365 Cloud PC baselines were not in the toolkit list I found.
OSConfig applies baselines on Windows Server 2025 via PowerShell, Admin Center and Azure PolicyConfirmedServer 2025 only. Roles: domain controller, member server, workgroup.
OSConfig contains more than 300 settingsUnverifiedNo source found, so the figure was removed.
Standard ASR rules can be enabled in Block or Warn mode without testingConfirmedMicrosoft says "typically"; other rules need Audit mode first.
Audit mode should run for two to four weeksUnverifiedNo official duration found. Left to your environment.
ASR covers Windows Server 2019 and laterConfirmedMinimum build 1809; Server 2016 and 2012 R2 via the modern unified solution.
EDR in block mode stops fileless attacks without signaturesWrongIt is aimed at devices where a non-Microsoft antivirus is primary. Requires Plan 2.
Credential Guard must be enabled through Group PolicyWrongOn by default from Windows 11 22H2 and Server 2025 for qualifying domain-joined non-DC systems.
Credential Guard should not be enabled on domain controllersConfirmedMicrosoft says it adds no security there and may cause compatibility issues.
Credential Guard stops credential theft even from kernel-level codeUnverifiedOverstated. Microsoft calls it a mitigation to combine with other layers.
LAPS password encryption is a simple settingConfirmedCorrected: requires Windows Server 2016 domain functional level or later.
dMSAs are designed to defeat KerberoastingCompany claimPress reports describe it as a mitigation. BadSuccessor (CVE-2025-53779) was fixed August 12, 2025.
Negative logon rights are among the most effective anti-lateral-movement controlsUnverifiedNo source found. Removed as a ranking claim.

Update

Update (November 16, 2026): Since the source article was written, the Windows Server 2025 baseline has been revised (June 2025, v2506), Credential Guard default enablement is documented as current behavior, and Microsoft released the fix for BadSuccessor (CVE-2025-53779) on August 12, 2025. I did not find a newer change that alters the main recommendations.

Change log: November 16, 2026 – corrected Credential Guard, EDR in block mode and LAPS details, added BadSuccessor and removed unsupported figures. November 16, 2026 – first published.

What users say

The clearest practitioner pattern concerns ASR and Configuration Manager. In a Microsoft community discussion, a contributor explained that the PSExec and WMI rule is incompatible with Configuration Manager management, because the rule blocks WMI commands the client needs. You can read it here. A separate administrator's blog post describes the same rule producing detections on ConfigMgr clients, and says that after adding exclusions the application installs went through normally. That post is here.

These are individual reports, and the second dates from 2021, so check current Microsoft guidance for your version. They do match the vendor advice to test most rules in Audit mode.

My take

I have not deployed these controls in a production estate myself. This is my view from reading the documentation and the reports around it.

  • Administrators need to know the hardening controls in Windows well. Baselines, ASR, Defender settings and identity controls protect systems only when the people running them understand what each setting does and what it can break.
  • The newest feature is not automatically the safest one. BadSuccessor showed that a security-motivated account type could open a path to domain compromise within months of release. I would pilot new identity features and patch quickly before relying on them.
  • My main reservation is the number of moving parts. Baselines, ASR rings, Credential Guard defaults and LAPS prerequisites all depend on versions and licenses. A small team could spend more effort tracking exceptions than defending, so I would prioritize the standard ASR rules, LAPS and tamper protection before the rest.

What this means for you

  • Pick one management path per device group. Use Group Policy or Intune for each setting, not both.
  • Verify, do not assume. Run Policy Analyzer or an equivalent compliance scan to confirm that GPOs actually apply.
  • Enable the three standard ASR rules, and put the other rules in Audit mode with a review date.
  • Check Configuration Manager dependencies before enforcing the PSExec and WMI rule.
  • Confirm Credential Guard status on Windows 11 and Server 2025, then test Wi-Fi, VPN and delegation paths.
  • Raise the domain functional level to 2016 or later if you want encrypted LAPS passwords, and consider a dedicated decryptor group.
  • Patch Windows Server 2025 domain controllers for CVE-2025-53779 and review who can create dMSAs.

FAQ

Should I use Group Policy or Intune? Use whichever fits each device group, and avoid managing the same setting from both. Domain-joined servers commonly use Group Policy, and cloud-managed clients commonly use Intune.

Is Credential Guard on by default everywhere? No. Microsoft documents default enablement for qualifying domain-joined, non-domain-controller systems on Windows 11 22H2 or later and Windows Server 2025, and not for systems explicitly configured to disable it.

Do I need EDR in block mode? Mainly if a non-Microsoft antivirus is your primary product and you have Defender for Endpoint Plan 2. If Defender Antivirus is your primary engine, focus first on cloud protection, tamper protection and ASR.

Sources

Post a Comment

0Comments

Post a Comment (0)